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Recent studies suggest that democracy and globalization lead to ethnic hatred and violence in countries with a rich ethnic minority. We examine the thesis by Chua (2003) that democratization and globalization lead to ethnic violence in the presence of a market-dominant minority. We use different data sets to measure market dominant minorities and employ panel fixed effects regressions for a sample of 107 countries over the period 1984-2003. Our model contains two-way and three-way interactions to examine under which conditions democracy and globalization increase violence. We find no evidence for a worldwide Chua effect, but we do find support for Chua’s thesis for Sub-Saharan Africa.

Keywords: Globalization, Democracy, Ethnic Violence, Market-dominant minorities
JEL codes: D74, J15






Democracy, Globalization and Ethnic Violence 







Amy Chua’s widely read ‘World on Fire’ (Chua, 2003) suggests that the current globalization and democratization waves are increasing ethnic violence in much of the developing world.​[1]​ While the book was both praised and criticized (see e.g. Glaeser, 2005; Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005), its claim has not received any support beyond anecdotal evidence.​[2]​ The aim of this paper is to examine the Chua thesis empirically.
 The ‘Chua thesis’ is based on the observation that in many developing countries a small ethnic minority has a large economic advantage over the indigenous majority. Examples are the Chinese in South-east Asia, the Lebanese in West Africa, Indians in East Africa and whites in Latin America. As these minorities live by and benefit from ‘the market’, Chua aptly labels them ‘market-dominant minorities’ (MDMs). MDMs typically control large parts of the economy so that globalizing markets favor them disproportionally. In turn, growing inequalities lead to resentment among the majority which, in democratic settings, cannot be contained by repression - or is even stimulated by office-seeking politicians (Glaeser, 2005). Chua’s main argument is that such resentment cause a violent backlash against the MDM, against markets and against democracy. 
Chua’s dismal scenario is particularly relevant given the strong democratization and globalization trends over the last two decades. Never before did so many countries in so few years switch from authoritarian to democratic polities (Jensen and Paldam, 2006). Furthermore, the second globalization wave gathered pace at a rate and scale which outranks the world’s first globalization era from the 1890s to the 1920s (Baldwin and Martin, 1999). While existing evidence suggests that both democracy and globalization tend to decrease conflict between countries (O’Neal and Russet, 2000), their relationship with internal conflict is less clear (Sambanis, 2002). Chua (2003) argues that where MDMs are present, the combination of democracy and globalization  constitutes a combustible mix.
We examine the Chua thesis for a panel of 107 countries over the period 1984-2003. Our measure for the presence of an MDM is taken from the Minorities at Risk project (MAR, 2005), which we compare with an analysis based on a data set distilled from Chua (2003). We employ a fixed-effects panel estimator to focus on the variation of ethnic violence within countries. Our empirical framework includes two-way and three-way interaction effects to examine whether globalization and democracy affect ethnic violence in MDM countries.
Previewing our results, we find partial but not global support for a Chua effect. In the full sample, neither democracy, nor globalization, nor a combination of both increase ethnic violence in MDM countries, defying a Chua effect. Instead, the results suggest that they do increase ethnic violence in non-MDM countries. However, if we include only Sub-Saharan African countries in the analysis, we do find strong evidence for a Chua effect. These findings survive a range of specification and robustness checks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss the ‘Chua thesis’ and relate it to the literature on civil conflict. In section III we present the data and our empirical framework. In Section IV we present our findings, while in section V we perform various sensitivity analyses and robustness checks. We conclude by reflecting on the merits and shortcomings of our study in section VI and suggest avenues for future research.


II.	The ‘Chua thesis’ and related literature

Chua argues that outbursts of ethnic violence in countries with an MDM result from the concurrence of democratization and globalization (Chua, 2003, p.16): “In the numerous countries around the world that have pervasive poverty and a market-dominant minority, democracy and markets – at least in the form in which they are currently being promoted – can proceed only in deep tension with each other. In such conditions, the combined pursuit of free markets and democratization has repeatedly catalyzed ethnic conflict in highly predictable ways, with catastrophic consequences, including genocidal violence and the subversion of markets and democracy themselves. This has been the sobering lesson of globalization over the last twenty years.”
Her claim is illustrated with many case studies. One example is the position of the Chinese in Indonesia. With just 3 percent of Indonesia’s 200 million population, they are estimated to control around 70 percent of the private economy and - although not all rich – they are ‘economically dominant at every level of society’ (Chua, 2003:43). While Indonesia’s extraordinary economic growth of the 1980s and 1990s increased average incomes for all, the general perception among indigenous Indonesians was that it favored the Chinese disproportionally. They were seen as accumulating immense wealth supported by their ties to the Suharto regime. This massive, widespread hostility was suppressed by the regime but erupted after Indonesia became more democratic. Anti-Chinese violence broke out in all the country’s major cities throughout 1998 (Chua, 2003:45). This episode illustrates the Chua thesis well: Indonesia’s sequence of abundant globalization and growth followed by tentative democratization proved highly dangerous to its market-dominant minority.
Two arguments underpin the ‘Chua thesis’.​[3]​ The first is that globalization and free markets breed domestic inequality along ethnic lines. The empirical evidence supports the view that globalization has been increasing domestic income inequality over the last thirty years (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). A second argument is that the introduction of democracy in countries with an MDM leads to ethnic hatred and, ultimately, ethnic violence. This relationship is studied by Glaeser (2005), who develops a model in which politicians may have electoral motives to spread hatred against a rich minority. The willingness of rational voters to believe hate-creating stories depends on their incentives to learn about the truth. Incentives are weak particularly if there are high costs of interacting with the minority (due to, for instance, language or cultural differences) or low returns of interacting. Chua’s emphasis on the MDM being an ethnic group and active in (typically commercial and financial) sectors not normally accessed by the majority of the population (which is employed in agriculture) naturally fits in with this model.








where yit is the dependent variable measuring violence resulting from ethnic tensions in country i in year t. α is a constant term, μi denotes the country fixed effect of country i , γt is the time specific effect of year t. GLit is an indicator measuring the degree of globalization in country i in year t. DEMit refers to our measure of democracy for country i in year t. MDMi denotes our dummy for a market dominant minority. The vector X contains a set of control variables suggested in previous studies on the determinants of  civil conflict. In the remainder of this section we discuss our data in more detail.
Chua (2003, p.6) defines an MDM as “an ethnic minority, who for widely varying reasons, tend under market conditions to dominate economically, often to a startling extent, the “indigenous” majorities around them.” An important aspect of this definition is ethnicity. According to Chua (2003, p. 14), ethnicity “.. refer[s] to a kind of group identification, a sense of belonging to a people, that is experienced “as a greatly extended form of kinship.” This definition of ethnicity is intended to be very broad, acknowledging the importance of subjective perceptions. It encompasses differences along racial lines, …, lines of geographic origin, …, as well as linguistic, religious, tribal, or other cultural lines.” 
Chua (2003) classifies 53 countries with an MDM and 45 countries without MDM. We list them in Appendix A. A drawback of the classification provided by Chua (2003) is that it is not clear whether a consistent MDM definition across country case studies is used. A second drawback is that Chua’s sample is based on unclear selection criteria. An analysis only on the basis of this classification might, therefore, be driven by a confirmation bias. Since these limitations preclude further data set expansion and call into question the validity of the data distilled from Chua (2003), we do not solely rely on this classification, but also consider an alternative source: the Minorities at Risk data set (MAR, 2005).
The MAR project reports on the status of ethnic minorities within nation states. These are defined as ethno-political groups that collectively suffer or benefit from systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society; and/or collectively mobilize in defense or promotion of their self-defined interests. A minority is included in the data set if the country in which they reside has a population greater than 500.000 and the minority has a population of at least 100.000 or one percent of the total population.
 From this source we use the variable ecdifxx, which purports to measure the “economic difference between individual minority groups relative to the majority”.​[7]​ The variable ecdifxx is scaled from -2 (very advantageous position of the minority) to + 4 (very disadvantageous position of the minority). The economic position of a minority is assessed over six dimensions: income level, ownership of land and other property, incidence of higher education and presence in commerce, the professions and official positions). For our purpose, we construct a dummy variable (labelled ‘MDM’) equal to one when there is at least one minority group within a country with an economically advantageous position (ecdifxx<0), and zero otherwise. Using this definition, there are 37 countries with an MDM and 118 without an MDM. Country classifications according to the MAR data are listed in Appendix B. In table 1 we compare the classification distilled from Chua (2003) with the MDM variable from the MAR data.  

[insert table 1 here]

The two MDM sources are similar but with noteworthy differences. They agree in 66 out of 98 cases (67%): in 44 cases both Chua (2003) and MAR indicate no MDM, while in 22 cases both indicate the presence of an MDM​[8]​. But there are 31 MDMs in the Chua (2003) data not identified by the MAR data. Conversely, the MAR data identify the Berbers in Algeria to be market-dominant, but according to Chua (2003, p. 213) Algeria has no MDM. Since the MAR data set covers more countries than the Chua study and uses transparent and consistent definitions, we use it in our main analysis below. To probe the robustness of our results, we also use the Chua (2003) data.
	It is important to note here that the presence of an MDM is different from ethnic fractionalization, usually defined as the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belong to different groups (e.g. Alesina et. al, 2003). Even when fractionalization scores are low MDMs can be present, as in the case of Russia where a small number of tycoons of Jewish origin dominate economically (Chua, 2003).   Conversely, the Central African Republic has no MDM, but scores high on all fractionalization measures.​[9]​ Moreover, MDMs are defined by ethnicity in general, while fractionalization measures differentiate between race, religion and language. The correlation coefficients in table 2 illustrate the difference between ethnic fractionalization and the concept of a market-dominant minority.​[10]​

[Insert table 2 here]

Our main democracy indicator is the widely used ‘polity2’ variable from the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). This variable ranges from -10 (very autocratic) to +10 (very democratic). As there are many different democracy indicators available in the literature (de Haan, 2007), we run auxiliary regressions with alternative democracy indicators to test the robustness of our results. These alternatives include the Gastil index, which is based on the level of political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House, 2006),  and several ‘democracy’ dummies. The first is taken from Przeworski et al. (2000), who define a democracy as a regime that holds elections in which the opposition has some chance of winning and taking office. The second dummy is due to Vanhanen (2000), who defines democracies by a minimum level of political competition and electoral participation.​[11]​  
	To proxy globalization, we use in our main analysis the KOF globalization index (Dreher, 2006), which is an aggregate index of economic, political and social globalization. We will also use its constitutive components in our robustness analysis. 
	To the best of our knowledge, there exists no source providing information on incidences (and intensity) of ethnic violence. Therefore, we use the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2005) assessments of internal conflicts and ethnic tensions as a proxy for ethnic violence. The variable “internal conflicts” (scaled from 0 to 6) assesses political violence and is based on the occurrence of civil war, the threat of a coup d’etat, the incidence of terrorist acts and the extent of civil disorder in a country. The variable “ethnic tension” ranges from 0 to 12 and is an assessment of the degree of tension within a country attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions.​[12]​
Arguably, “internal conflicts” and” “ethnic tensions” are incomplete measures for ethnic violence. “Internal conflicts” may well capture more than only violence resulting from ethnic hatred. Conversely, ethnic tensions may not result in actual violence. A scatter plot of the two variables confirms that, in general, countries with severe ethnic tensions have more internal conflict, but also that the correlation is far from perfect. To proxy ethnic violence we therefore use the product of “ethnic tensions” and “internal conflicts” as our dependent variable. 

[Insert figure 1 here]





Baseline estimation results are shown in table 3. In columns 1-3 we sequentially examine the one-way, two-way and three-way interaction effects of MDMs, democracy and globalization on ethnic violence using the MAR data as our MDM variable. In columns 4-6 we follow the same procedure, but use the classification of Chua (2003).

[insert table 3 here]

The results using the classification of MAR and those obtained with the Chua data (2003) are very similar. In the first (and fourth) specification the coefficient on the level of democracy is insignificant, but all variables in specification 2-3 (and 5-6) are highly significant, with the exception of globalization in models (3) and (5).​[14]​ This implies that the effects of globalization and democracy are non-linear and interaction effects are present in the data. However, table 3 does not yet allow us to evaluate the implications of the Chua thesis; the estimated coefficients (and their standard errors) in interaction analysis are meaningless and have to be evaluated conditional on the other interacted variables, by calculating appropriate marginal effects (see Brambor et al, 2006). Before we do so, we first account for a potential omitted variable bias by including different control variables that have been suggested in the literature. The results are shown in table 4.

[insert table 4 here] 

In columns 1-4 we add several economic variables to our model, i.e., GDP per capita, real GDP growth, the unemployment rate and inflation (all variables are taken from the World Bank Development Indicators, 2005). Confirming earlier findings of the literature, we find that lower income, lower income growth and higher unemployment are significantly related to more ethnic violence. But, more importantly, the sign and significance of the variables of interest are unchanged. In column 5 we include a measure of wage inequality from the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP, 2006), but its impact is insignificant. Next, we include a measure of corruption (ICRG, 2005) in the model as a proxy for weak governance. Although we focus on the within variation of the data, we find that this variable is highly significant. Finally, we examine whether ethnic violence is affected by regional ethnic conflicts. To do so, we follow the approach of Ades and Chua (1997), who construct an index for regional political instability. This index is a (weighted) average of the instability observed in country i’s neighbouring countries. In our case, we calculate this index for country i in year t on the basis of the ethnic violence scores observed in the neighbouring countries. The results shown in column 7 indicate that regional ethnic violence is strongly related to domestic ethnic violence. In column 8 we add all significant control variables to the model. Unemployment and economic growth are now insignificant. Therefore, we exclude them in column 9, which is our preferred specification.​[15]​ We repeat this procedure using the MDM classification of Chua (2003). The last column shows the results of model specification 9, but now with the Chua (2003) MDM variable. It is (again) clear that the results are insensitive to the choice of MDM variable.
	To interpret our results, we plot the marginal effects (and their 95% confidence intervals) of democracy and globalization for MDM countries and non-MDM countries in figures 2 and 3, respectively.​[16]​ 

[Insert figures 2 and 3 here]

Figures 2a and 2b show that in MDM countries, democracy and globalization are not significantly related to ethnic violence. The effects of both variables do not depend on each other. In figure 3a and 3b the same plots are depicted, but now for non-MDM countries. As figure 3a shows, we now do find an interaction effect between globalization and democracy. Specifically, democracy increases ethnic violence once a country has a relatively high level of globalization. Again, we find largely no effect of globalization on ethnic violence – only for very autocratic countries globalization is just significant. On the basis of these results, we find no support for the Chua thesis.

V.	Robustness Analysis
We subject our analysis to a large number of additional robustness and specification checks.​[17]​ First, we replace our democracy and globalization indices by a number of alternative measures. That is, we substitute the polity2 index with the measures of Vanhanen (2000), Przeworski et al. (2000) and the Freedomhouse (2006) and we replace the globalization index by the disaggregated measures (economic, political and social globalization) of globalization of Dreher (2006). None of these changes affects our results. Secondly, we consider an alternative approach to measure ethnic violence. We regard ethnic violence as a latent concept and use factor analysis on a number of violence indicators as well as the individual ICRG measures.​[18]​ The correlation between our preferred index and the factor score is 0.77. Our results are unaffected.​[19]​
	Theoretically, it is possible that our results suffer from attrition bias, i.e., a number of ethnically divided countries (e.g. Yugoslavia) dropped from the sample and have become ethnically more homogenous countries (e.g. Slovenia). If we focus on a sample of countries for which we have data throughout the entire time period (89 countries, N=1708), we find that attrition bias is not driving our results.
	We further examine the robustness of our results using alternative estimation techniques. First, we employ panel corrected and autocorrelated standard errors to account for possible time dependency in the data.  Next, we estimate the model using a different robust estimators. We use the robust regression routine of Stata 9.2, which is based on iteratively least squares (Huber and Tukey bi-weight functions). Furthermore, we also use the Least Trimmed Squares estimator by Rousseeuw (1985). We conclude that our results are not driven by time dependence or outliers in the data. 




Why have many developing countries witnessed outbreaks of excessive ethnic violence? Chua (2003) suggested the root cause is the concurrence of globalizing markets and increasing democracy in countries where a small ethnic minority economically dominates the indigenous majority. In this paper we empirically examine the Chua thesis.
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, in Chua’s thesis, a crucial role is devoted to market-dominant minorities. We use different sources to identify these minorities and find that there are substantial differences with conventional measures of ethnic fractionalization. Our second contribution is that we focus on the interaction of ethnic differences, democracy and globalization. This contrasts the existing literature which has mainly focused on the direct impact of these variables. 
	On the basis of our empirical analysis we conclude that there is no evidence for a worldwide Chua effect. However, when we focus on the region which is currently most infamous for its ethnic violence, we do find strong evidence. In Sub-Saharan Africa, democracy sparks ethnic conflict and the effect increases as countries in the region are more globalized. Importantly, we find that democracy decreases ethnic conflict when market-dominant minorities are absent. We conclude that these market dominant minorities are the crucial moderators responsible for the combustible effect of democracy plus globalization in Sub-Saharan Africa. The question why this region is different from the rest of the world is left for further research.
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Sources: Chua (2003), Minorities at Risk project (2005).













Table 3. Estimation results baseline model.

















F-test country fixed effects, prob > F	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
F-test time fixed effects, prob > F	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Ramsey Reset test prob > F	0.45	0.07	0.14	0.83	0.33	0.95
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions include a constant and country and time specific effects (not shown).







Table 4. Estimation results with additional control variables.































F-test fixed country effects, prob>F	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
F-test fixed time effects, prob>F	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Ramsey Reset test, prob >F	0.61	0.14	0.34	0.37	0.72	0.15	0.31	0.24	0.82	0.29
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions include a constant  and country and time specific effects (not shown). GL is the globalization variable. DEM refers to the democracy measure and MDM is the market-dominant minority dummy.




Figure 1. Relationship (scatterplot) between internal conflict and ethnic tensions, 1984-2003





Figure 2a. Marginal effect on ethnic violence of democracy in MDM countries.

Note:  The point estimates are calculated on the basis of model 9 in table 4. The lower and upper bound give the 95% confidence interval.

Figure 2b. Marginal effect on ethnic violence of globalization in MDM countries.





Figure 3a. Marginal effect on ethnic violence of democracy  in non- MDM countries.

Note:  The point estimates are calculated on the basis of model 9 in table 4. The lower and upper bound give the 95% confidence interval.

Figure 3b. Marginal effect on ethnic violence of globalization  in non- MDM countries.

Note:  The point estimates are calculated on the basis of model 9 in table 4. The lower and upper bound give the 95% confidence interval.


Figure 4a. Marginal effect on ethnic violence of democracy in Sub-Saharan African MDM countries.

Note:  The point estimates are calculated on the basis of model specification 9 in table 4 – for a sample of only Sub-Saharan African countries. The lower and upper bound give the 95% confidence interval.

Figure 4b. Marginal effect on ethnic violence of globalization in Sub-Saharan African MDM countries.

Note:  The point estimates are calculated on the basis of model specification 9 in table 4 – for a sample of only Sub-Saharan African countries. The lower and upper bound give the 95% confidence interval.
Figure 5a. Marginal effect on ethnic violence of democracy in Sub-Saharan African non-MDM countries.

Note:  The point estimates are calculated on the basis of model specification 9 in table 4 – for a sample of only Sub-Saharan African countries. The lower and upper bound give the 95% confidence interval.

Figure 5b. Marginal effect on ethnic violence of globalization in Sub-Saharan African non-MDM countries.

Note:  The point estimates are calculated on the basis of model specification 9 in table 4 – for a sample of only Sub-Saharan African countries. The lower and upper bound give the 95% confidence interval.
Appendix A. Countries with and without MDM according to Chua (2003)



























































































ZAF	South Africa	Asians, Coloreds, Europeans, Zulus
ZAR	Congo, Dem. Rep.	Luba, Hutus, Ngbandi, Tutsi
ZWE	Zimbabwe	Europeans
		









































Source: Minorities at Risk Project (2005)


Appendix C. Descriptive Statistics

















































^1	  See also Chua  (1995, 1998, 2000).
^2	  Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) purport to test the ‘Chua thesis’ and related ‘pundits’ claims’ (Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005:50) but actually analyze whether transitions to democracy affect economic growth. We instead examine whether (the concurrence of) globalization and democracy affects ethnic violence levels, as claimed by Chua.
^3	  One way to view the ‘Chua thesis’ is as a contemporary version of Huntington’s (1968) early work. He argued that resentment by those left behind in an economic growth episode would cause political instability unless restraining (often repressive) institutions were in place. Chua´s conjecture is more specific in that it posits that economically powerful ethnic minorities unwillingly act as focal points of resentment and attractors of violence.
^4	  A complete review can be found in Sambanis (2002).
^5	  Other studies that examine the impact of economic variables are Collier and Hoeffler (2002), Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Miguel et al. (2004).
^6	  The inclusion of both country and time specific effects is based on different statistical tests. Hausman tests reject the null-hypothesis that the estimates of the fixed effects model are equal to the estimates of a random effects model. F-tests reject the null-hypotheses that all country and time specific effects are zero.
^7	  See Minorites at Risk Project codebook (2005).
^8	  It should be noted that the consistency between the two classifications increases to 75% if all Latin American countries are excluded. Latin America’s economic elites tend to be of lighter skin (it is a ‘pigmentocracy’), but their ethnic affiliation is unclear and they are mostly not listed as a minority in the MAR data. Another reason why the two sources differ is the size restriction included in the MAR criteria, while Chua (2003) also refers to very small groups that are economically dominant
^9	  The fractionalization scores for Russia and the Central African Republic (within brackets) are: ethnic fractionalization 0.25 (0.83), religious fractionalization 0.25 (0.83), language fractionalization 0.44 (0.79).  
^10	  Furthermore, it also important to note that our MDM measure is different from the “ethnic dominance” variable as used by e.g. Collier (2001). “Ethnic dominance” refers to situations in which one ethnic group outnumbers other ethnic groups.  
^11	  More specifically, democracies are polities in which at least 10% of the electorate votes and the largest political party receives not more than 70% of the votes.
^12	  In the ICRG data, higher values indicate lower levels of internal conflicts and ethnic tension, respectively. In our analysis, we multiplied each variable by -1 such that higher values imply higher level of conflict (or/and ethnic tension).
^13	  These explanatory variables are based on actual incidences of violence and include: a civil war dummy (Gleditsch et al. 2002 and updates), dummies indicating the presence of small communal conflict and medium communal conflict (Gleditsch et al. 2002 and updates), the number of guerrilla warfare attacks in a country, political revolutions, political assassinations and coups d’etat in a country (Banks 2005) and the number of deadly terrorist attacks in a country (MIPT, 2004).
^14	  We also ran the same regressions using ‘ethnic tensions’ and ‘internal conflicts’ as our dependent variable. The results of these regressions, which are available on request, were nearly identical to the results we present in tables 6 and 7 and therefore we use only the aggregate indicator in the remainder of the analysis. 
^15	  We have also done a general to specific model selection procedure in which we dropped the least significant variable until only significant variables remained. The outcome is identical to specification 9.
^16	  The figures are based on the results of column 9, table 4.
^17	  As explained in the previous section, the estimation results can only be interpreted conditional on the other covariates. Therefore, we opt not to present a table with estimation results. Furthermore, we only show the marginal effect plots when the alternative estimation results are substantially different from the results of figure 2a and 2b. All results are available on request.
^18	  Besides the ICRG assessments, we used the same violence indicators as mentioned in section 3. See footnote 13.
^19	  We also run the analysis using (only) the civil war dummy as dependent variable. Again the results were very similar to our main results. 
^20	  Using the same robustness checks as discussed earlier in this section, the results for the Sub-Saharan sub-sample turn out to be robust.
